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Probability Logic:
A Model Theoretic Perspective
M. Pourmahdian∗
R. Zoghifard†
Abstract
In this paper (propositional) probability logic (PL) is investigated from model
theoretic point of view. First of all, the ultraproduct construction is adapted for
σ-additive probability models, and subsequently when this class of models is
considered it is shown that the compactness property holds with respect to a
fragment of PL called basic probability logic (BPL). On the other hand, when
dealing with finitely-additive probability models, one may extend the compact-
ness property for a larger fragment of probability logic, namely positive proba-
bility logic (PPL). We finally prove that while the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number
of the class of σ-additive probability models is uncountable, it is ℵ0 for the class
of finitely additive probability models.
Keywords: Probability modal logic, Type spaces, Ultraproduct construction, Henkin
method, Compactness property, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number.
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
Propositional probability logic (PL) is a framework for specifying and analyzing prop-
erties of structures involving probability, e.g. probability spaces or Markov processes.
This logic provides rules of reasoning about these structures. This natural logic is a
modal logic in which bounds on probability are treated as modal operators. So, for
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each α ∈ Q∩[0,1], the language of PL includes a modal operator Lα interpreted as (an
agent) assigns probability at least α. This logic is shown to be useful in many research
areas such as theoretical computer science, economics and philosophy. For example
this logic might be used to reason about behavior of a program under probabilistic
assumptions about inputs. Also one can highlight how probability systems and partic-
ular probability logic play a crucial rule in game theory. A type space is an example of
a probabilistic system, introduced by Harsanyi in [10], provides an implicit description
of beliefs in games with incomplete information. So, in particular PL is known to be
useful for studying of type spaces.
This logic is studied from different perspectives. There is a rich source of papers
involving full axiomatization of this logic, aiming to show different type of completeness
results, [5, 11, 23, 24]. A coalgebraic point of view is another source of research in
this area, [8, 15]. The aim of this paper is to study this logic from model theoretic
perspectives.
To be able to state our results in technical terms we review basic concepts of PL.
Assume that P is a countable set of propositional variables. The syntax of prob-
ability logic is obtained by adding countable probability modal operators Lr,Mr for
each r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1] to propositional logic. When applying the operator Lr to a formula
ϕ, then Lrϕ is interpreted as “the formula ϕ has probability at least r”. In the same
way, the intended meaning of formula Mrϕ is “the formula ϕ has probability at most
r”.
Definition 1.1. Formulas of probability logic (PL) is defined by the following gram-
mar:
PL ∶= p ∣ ¬ϕ ∣ ϕ ∧ ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ϕ ∣ Lrϕ ∣ Mrϕ,
where p ∈ P and r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1].
In the following we also consider two fragments of probability logic, namely, basic
probability logic and positive probability logic.
Definition 1.2. The basic probability logic (BPL) and respectively positive proba-
bility logic (PPL) are defined by the following grammars:
BPL ∶= p ∣ ¬p ∣ ϕ ∧ ϕ ∣ ϕ ∨ ϕ ∣ Lrϕ.
PPL ∶= BPL ∣ Mrϕ.
Note that in both BPL and PPL the negation only applies to elements of the
set P. Furthermore, BPL is a proper fragment of PPL in which applying the modal
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operators Lr is only allowed. Note that BPL ⊊ PPL ⊊ PL. We also name these
fragments as probability logics.
The other logical connectives (∨, →, ↔) have their standard definitions.
To interpret the formulas in PL we have to define the notion of probability models.
For any measurable space (Ω,A) let ∆(Ω,A) be the measurable space of all σ-
additive probability measures on Ω whose σ-algebra generated by the sets
{µ ∈∆(Ω,A) ∣ µ(E) ≥ r} for all E ∈ A and r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1].
Definition 1.3. A type space over a measurable space (Ω,A), is a tripleM = (Ω,A, T )
where T is a measurable function from Ω to ∆(Ω,A).
Ω and T are respectively called a set of states (or possible worlds) and a type
function. It follows from the above definition, for w ∈ Ω, T (w) defines a probability
measure on the σ-algebra A. Furthermore, its measurability indicates that for each
E ∈ A and r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1],
{ω ∈ Ω ∣ T (ω,E) ≥ r} ∈ A.
Type spaces are regarded as semantical devices for probability logics. We show that
probability logic and its fragments introduced above have different model theoretic
features.
Definition 1.4. A probability model is a tuple M = (Ω,A, T, v) where the triple
(Ω,A, T ) is a type space and v ∶ P → A is a valuation function which assigns to each
proposition p ∈ P the measurable set v(p) ∈ A.
Definition 1.5. A finitely additive probability model is a tuple M = (Ω,A, T ∶ Ω×A →
[0,1], v ∶ P → A) where
• A is an algebra over Ω ≠ ∅.
• For each w ∈ Ω, T (w) defines a finitely additive measure on A.
• T is a measurable function, i.e. for each E ∈ A and r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1], {w ∈
Ω ∣ T (w)(E) ≥ r} ∈ A.
A model M with a distinguished point w ∈ Ω is called a pointed probability model
and denoted by (M,w).
Denote the class of pointed probability models by PM and respectively the class
of finitely additive probability pointed models by FPM. Notice that PM ⊊ FPM.
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Definition 1.6. For a pointed (finitely additive) probability model (M,w) and a
formula ϕ ∈ PL the satisfaction relation M,w ⊧ ϕ is defined inductively in the usual
way for propositional variables and boolean connectives. For Lr,Mr operators, if we
assume JϕKM = {w ∈ Ω ∣ M,w ⊧ ϕ}, then
M,w ⊧ Lrϕ if and only if T (w)(JϕKM) ≥ r
and
M,w ⊧Mrϕ if and only if T (w)(JϕKM) ≤ r.
We often omit the subscript M from JϕKM and write JϕK when no confusion can
arise. Note that, by definition of v and measurability of T , it is easy to see that JϕK ∈ A
for any formula ϕ. Notice that for any formula ϕ and r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1], M,w ⊭ Lrϕ if
and only if M,w ⊧ Msϕ, for some s < r. A similar statement holds for Mrϕ. This
means that the negation of positive formulas can be defined by an infinite disjunction
of positive formulas.
The other syntactical and semantical components of probability logics can be de-
fined in the usual way. In particular, if L ∈ {PL,BPL,PPL} then any set of L-formulas
is called an L-theory. Let K be a subclass of FPM. An L-theory T is satisfiable in K if
there exists a pointed model (M,w) ∈ K such that M,w ⊧ ϕ, for each ϕ ∈ T . Likewise,
T is finitely satisfiable in K if every finite subset of T is satisfiable in K. An L-theory T
is maximally satisfiable (respectively maximally finitely satisfiable) if it is maximal in
the poset of satisfiable L-theories (respectively finitely satisfiable L-theories) ordered
by inclusion relation. We say that the logic L has the compactness property with re-
spect to class K if an L-theory T is satisfiable in K if and only if T is finitely satisfiable
in K. In this paper the following results are established.
1. (Theorem 2.5) BPL has the compactness property with respect to PM.
2. (Theorem 2.13) PPL has the compactness property with respect to FPM.
We also study the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of the class of probability and finitely
additive probability models. Recall that the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of a class K of
logic L is the least infinite cardinal κ such that every satisfiable L-theory has a model
of size at most κ.
1. (Theorem 3.1) Let λ be the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of probability models
with respect to probability logic. Then ℵ0 < λ ≤ 2ℵ0.
2. (Theorem 3.4) The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of the class of finitely additive
probability models with respect to probability logic is ℵ0.
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2 Compactness Property
In this section we study the compactness property for BPL and PPL.
2.1 Compactness for BPL
In this subsection we show that the basic probability logic, BPL, satisfies the com-
pactness property with respect to PM. It is known that the compactness property
does not hold for (full) probability logic. To see this consider the PL-theory
T = {L 1
2
−
1
4n+1
p ∣ n ∈ N} ∪ {¬L 1
2
p}. (1)
It is easy to show that T is finitely satisfiable but not satisfiable.
The failure of compactness in PL is partly due to this fact that by using the negation
one can express the strict inequality. However, as BPL only applies the negation on
propositions the above example is not a BPL-theory. In fact then restrict ourselves to
BPL we will see that the compactness holds in this logic. To achieve this, we adapt
the ultraproduct construction for probability models and show that the  Los´ theorem
holds for basic formulas, which means that BPL enjoys the compactness property. We
recall first some primary notions related to the ultraproduct construction.
Let U be an ultrafilter over a non-empty set I and (ai)i∈I be a sequence of elements
from R, the set of real numbers. The U -limit of this sequence, denoted by limU ai, is
an element r ∈ R such that for every ǫ > 0 we have {i ∈ I ∣ ∣ai − r∣ < ǫ} ∈ U . It is known
that each bounded sequence of elements of R has a unique limit over each ultrafilter.
Furthermore, if (ai)i∈I is a bounded sequence of elements of R and U is an ultrafilter
over I then
• If {i ∈ I ∣ ai ≥ r} ∈ U , then limU ai ≥ r.
• If limU ai > r, then {i ∈ I ∣ ai > r} ∈ U .
• limU ai ≥ r if and only if for every r′ < r we have {i ∈ I ∣ ai ≥ r′} ∈ U .
For a family ⟨Ωi ∶ i ∈ I⟩ of sets indexed by I, let ∏i∈I Ωi be the Cartesian product
of this family defined as the set ∏i∈I Ωi = {(wi)i∈I ∣ wi ∈ Ωi}. Two elements (wi)i∈I and
(vi)i∈I in ∏i∈I Ωi are U -equivalent, denoted by (wi)i∈I ∼U (vi)i∈I , if {i ∈ I ∣ wi = vi} ∈ U .
Clearly ∼U defines an equivalence relation on ∏i∈I Ωi. Let (wi)U be the equivalence
class of (wi)i∈I , and the resulting ∏U Ωi be the set of all equivalence classes.
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Now suppose (Ωi,Ai, Ti)i∈I is a family of type spaces. Then for each sequence (Ai)i∈I
with Ai ∈ Ai set
(Ai)U = {(wi)U ∈∏
U
Ωi ∣ {i ∈ I ∣ wi ∈ Ai} ∈ U}
and let A = { (Ai)U ∣ Ai ∈ Ai}. It is easy to see that A forms a boolean algebra over
∏U Ωi. Now, define the function T ′ ∶∏U Ωi ×A→ [0,1] as follows:
T ′((wi)U)((Ai)U) = lim
U
Ti(wi)(Ai). (∗)
Note that since for each (wi)i∈I the sequence (Ti(wi))i∈I is a bounded sequence of
real numbers, the U -limit limU Ti(wi)(Ai) exists. Moreover, if (wi)i∈I ∼U (vi)i∈I then
for each (Ai)U ∈ A we have limU Ti(wi)(Ai) = limU Ti(vi)(Ai). Also (Ai)U = (Bi)U
implies that {i ∈ I ∣ Ai = Bi} ∈ U . Hence (∗) is well-defined.
Lemma 2.1. For each (wi)U ∈ ∏U Ωi, the function T ′((wi)U)(.) is a premeasure on
the boolean algebra A.
Proof. Fix (wi)U ∈∏U Ωi. First note that
T ′((wi)U)(∅) = lim
U
Ti(wi)(∅) = 0.
Now we have to show that whenever {(Aji)U ∣ j ∈ N} is a countable family of disjoint
members of A if ⋃j∈N(A
j
i)U ∈ A, then
T ′((wi)U)(⋃
j∈N
(Aji)U) =∑
j∈N
T ′((wi)U)((A
j
i )U).
By Fact A.2, we prove that for each decreasing sequence (A0i )U ⊇ (A
1
i )U ⊇ . . . of
elements of A, if ⋂j(A
j
i)U = ∅ then limj→∞T
′((wi)U)(A
j
i) = 0.
Now suppose on the contrary that limj→∞ T ′((wi)U)(A
j
i) > 0. So, there exists ǫ > 0
such that for all j ∈ N we have limU Ti(wi)(A
j
i) > ǫ. So Ij = {i ∈ I ∣ Ti(wi)(A
j
i) ≥ ǫ} ∈ U ,
for all j ∈ N.
Now we show that there is a decreasing sequence ((Bji )j∈N)U such that (A
j
i)U =
(Bji )U and for some i ∈ I, ⋂j B
j
i = ∅ , while Ti(wi)(B
j
i ) ≥ ǫ, for each j ∈ N.
Since (Ai)
j
U ⊇ (Ai)
j+1
U , it follows that {i ∈ I ∣ A
j
i ⊇ A
j+1
i } ∈ U , for each j ∈ N.
Thus for each j ∈ N we have
Sj = {i ∈ I ∣ A
0
i ⊇ A
j
i} ∩ {i ∈ I ∣ Ti(wi)(A
j
i ) ≥ ǫ} ∈ U.
Now define the sets Bji as follows:
B
j
i =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
A0i if j = 0 or i /∈ Sj and k =minn(i ∈ Sn),
A
j
i if j > 0 and i ∈ Sj.
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Hence, {i ∈ I ∣ Bji ⊇ B
j+1
i } ∈ U for each j ∈ N. Also, Ti(wi)(B
j
i ) ≥ ǫ for each j ∈ N and
each i ∈ I0. Furthermore, by definition of B
j
i s we have (B
j
i )U = (A
j
i)U . So ⋂j(B
j
i )U = ∅.
Since I0 ∈ U , there exists i ∈ I0 such that ⋂j B
j
i = ∅. But this contradicts Ti(wi)(B
j
i ) ≥
ǫ.
Therefore, for each (wi)U ∈ ∏U Ωi, the function T ′((wi)U)(.) is a premeasure on
A. So by Fact A.5, it could be extended to the measure T ((wi)U)(.) on AU = σ(A).
Now to prove that T is a type function on (∏U Ωi,AU) we have to show that it is
measurable, i.e.
{(wi)U ∣ T ((wi)U)(E) ≥ α} ∈ AU ,
for each E ∈ AU and α ∈ Q ∩ [0,1].
Lemma 2.2. T is a measurable function.
Proof. Let
B = {E ∈ σ(A) ∣ for each r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1], {w ∣ T (w)(E) ≥ r} ∈ σ(A)}.
First we show that if E ∈ A, then E ∈ B. In this situation, there are Ei ∈ Ai such that
E = (Ei)U . So we have
{(wi)U ∣ T ((wi)U)(E) ≥ α} = {(wi)U ∣ lim
U
Ti(wi)(Ei) ≥ α}
= {(wi)U ∣ ∀α′ < α,α′ ∈ Q ∩ [0,1],{i ∈ I ∣ Ti(wi)(Ei) ≥ α′} ∈ U}
= ⋂
α′<α
α′∈Q∩[0,1]
{(wi)U ∣ {i ∈ I ∣ Ti(wi)(Ei) ≥ α
′} ∈ U}.
On the other hand for each α′ ∈ Q ∩ [0,1] with α′ < α,
{(wi)U ∣ {i ∈ I ∣ Ti(wi)(Ei) ≥ α
′} ∈ U} = (Ai)U
where Ai = {wi ∣ Ti(wi)(Ei) ≥ α′}, for each i ∈ I. Hence (Ai)U ∈ A and therefore,
⋂
α′<α
α′∈Q∩[0,1]
{(wi)U ∣ {i ∈ I ∣ Ti(wi)(Ei) ≥ α
′} ∈ U} ∈ AU .
Next we show that if E is a union of an increasing sequence E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ . . . of elements
of B then E ∈ B.
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Assume that E1 ⊆ E2 ⊆ . . . such that Ej ∈ AU and E = ⋃j Ej and the claim is true
for each Ej.
H = {(wi)U ∣ T ((wi)U)(E) ≥ α} = {(wi)U ∣ T ((wi)U)(⋃
j
Ej) ≥ α}
= {(wi)U ∣ lim
j→∞
T ((wi)U)(Ej) ≥ α}
= {(wi)U ∣ ∀α′ < α ∃j T ((wi)U)(Ej) ≥ α′}
= ⋂
α′<α
α′∈Q∩[0,1]
∞
⋃
j=1
{(wi)U ∣ T ((wi)U)(Ej) ≥ α
′}.
By induction hypothesis for each j and each α′ < α we have {(wi)U ∣ T ((wi)U)(Ej) >
α′} ∈ AU . Since AU is a σ-algebra, it follows that H ∈ AU .
Therefore, B is a monotone class which includes the algebra A. So by Fact A.1,
B = σ(A) and the proof is complete.
Based on the above lemmas, we define ultraproduct of probability models.
Definition 2.3. Let ⟨Mi = (Ωi,Ai, Ti, vi) ∶ i ∈ I⟩ be a family of probability models and
U be a non-principal ultrafilter over I. The ultraproduct of the family of probability
models ⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ I⟩ over U is a model M =∏U Mi = (ΩU ,AU , TU , vU) where
• ΩU , AU and TU are defined as above.
• (wi)U ∈ vU(p) if and only if {i ∈ I ∣ wi ∈ vi(p)} ∈ U .
To ease the notation for each formula ϕ we use JϕKU instead of JϕK∏U Mi.
The following theorem gives a weak version of the  Los´ theorem for basic probability
logic.
Theorem 2.4. Let ⟨Mi ∶ i ∈ I⟩ be a family of probability models and U be a non-
principal ultrafilter over I. Suppose ϕ is a basic formula. Then {i ∈ I ∣Mi,wi ⊧ ϕ} ∈ U
implies ∏U Mi, (wi)U ⊧ ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of basic formulas one can show that for each
basic formula ϕ we have
(JϕKMi)U ⊆ JϕKU .
In fact, by definition, for the atomic formulas and their negations we have (JϕKMi)U =
JϕKU .
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It is also easy to prove the induction step for the boolean connectives ∧ and ∨. Now
knowing the induction hypothesis for basic formula ϕ we have the followings:
(wi)U ∈ (JLrϕKMi)U ⇒ {i ∈ I ∣ wi ∈ JLrϕKMi} ∈ U
⇒ {i ∈ I ∣ Ti(wi)(JϕKMi) ≥ r} ∈ U
⇒ lim
U
Ti(wi)(JϕKMi) ≥ r
⇒ T ((wi)U)((JϕKMi)U) ≥ r
⇒ T ((wi)U)(JϕKU) ≥ r
⇒ (wi)U ∈ JLrϕKU .
Note that the fifth line is obtained from the fourth line by the induction hypothesis.
The above one directional statement is mainly due to the fundamental fact that
limU(ai) ≥ r does not imply that {i ∈ I ∶ ai ≥ r} ∈ U . However the above theorem still
enables us to prove the compactness theorem for basic probability logic.
Theorem 2.5 (BPL-Compactness). Suppose that Γ is a BPL-theory. Then Γ is
satisfiable in PM if and only if it is finitely satisfiable.
We conclude this subsection by giving an example which shows that the compact-
ness fails even for positive probability logic. So, even by avoiding negation and mixing
Lr and Ms operators we could find a theory Γ which is finitely satisfiable but not
satisfiable.
Example 2.6. Let
Σ = { M0(M0p ∨L1p) } ∪ { M 1
2
(L 1
2i
p ∧M
1−
1
2i
p) ∣ i ∈ N}.
We show that Σ is finitely satisfiable but it is not satisfiable in any probability model.
For each probability model M, Put
A0 = {w ∈ Ω ∣ T (w)(JpK) = 0} and A
′
0 = {w ∈ Ω ∣ T (w)(JpK) = 1}.
Also for each i ∈ N, let
Ai = {w ∈ Ω ∣
1
2i
≤ T (w)(JpK) ≤ 1 −
1
2i
}.
For each finite subset Σ′ ⊆ Σ, suppose k is the greatest index i such that M 1
2
(L 1
2i
p ∧
M
1−
1
2i
p) ∈ Σ′. Let M be a probability model (Ω = {w1,w2},P(Ω), T, v) such that
v(p) = {w1} and
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• T (w1)({w1}) = T (w1)({w2}) =
1
2
,
• 0 < T (w2)({w1}) <
1
2k
,
• T (w2)({w2}) = 1 − T (w2)({w1}).
Therefore, M,w1 ⊧ Σ′.
However, Σ is not satisfiable, since otherwise, if M,w ⊧ Σ we have T (w)(A0) =
T (w)(A′
0
) = 0 and T (w)(Ai) ≤
1
2
, for all i ∈ N. As T (w) is a σ-additive probability
measure and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ . . . , we have T (w)(⋃iAi) = limi→∞ T (w)(Ai) ≤ 12 . On the
other hand, Ω = A0 ∪ A′0 ∪ ⋃
∞
i=1Ai = A0 ∪ A
′
0
∪ {w′ ∈ Ω ∣ 0 < T (w′)(JpK) < 1}. So,
T (w)(Ω) = T (w)(A0) + T (w)(A′0) + T (w)(⋃
∞
i=1Ai) < 1, a contradiction.
In subsection 2.2, we show that in the above example Σ has a finitely additive
probability model. In fact when working with the finitely additive probability models
the compactness property holds for positive probability logic PPL.
2.2 The Compactness for PPL
In this subsection we prove that PPL has the compactness property with respect to
the class of finitely additive probability models.
As we noted, Example 2.6 shows that when working with probability models the
compactness property fails for PPL. So, it is not possible to adapt the ultraproduct
construction for finitely additive probability models to prove the PPL-compactness.
However, we will see that the Henkin method can be implemented to prove this property
for finitely additive probability models.
In the following we show that the PPL-theory Σ given in the Example 2.6 is
satisfiable in FPM, i.e. there exists a finitely additive pointed model M,w ⊧ Σ.
Example 2.7. Let Σ be a PPL-theory as given in Example 2.6. Define the model
M = (N,P(N), T, v) which satisfies the following conditions:
• v(p) = {0}.
• For each n ≠ 0, T (n) is a σ-additive measure on P(N) with the condition
T (n)({x}) =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
2n
if 0 ≤ x ≤ 2n − 1,
0 if x > 2n − 1.
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• For a non-principal ultrafilter U over N, we define T (0) as:
T (0)(X) =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if X ∈ U,
0 if X /∈ U.
It is easy to see that T (0) is a finitely additive probability measure. Note that
for every i ≠ 0, {w ∈ N ∣ 1
2i
≤ T (w)(JpK) ≤ 1 − 1
2i
} = {1, . . . , i} ∉ U . So for the point
0 we have
T (0)(JpK) = 0,
T (0)(JM0pK) = T (0)({0}) = 0,
T (0)(JL1pK) = T (0)(∅) = 0,
T (0)(JL 1
2i
p ∧M
1−
1
2i
pK) = T (0)({1, . . . , i}) = 0,
T (0)({n ∣ 0 < T (n)(JpK) < 1}) = T (0)(N ∖ {0}) = 1.
Therefore, M,0 ⊧ Σ.
To prove the compactness property for PPL-theories, we construct a canonical
finitely additive probability model MC = (ΩC ,P(ΩC), TC , vC) whose set of states ΩC
consists of all maximally finitely satisfiable positive theories such that its satisfaction
relation is given by MC ,Γ ⊧ ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Γ, for each Γ ∈ ΩC and positive formula
ϕ. Lemma 2.10 is the key ingredient in proving the truth lemma and is based on the
following known fact which relates the satisfiability of a formula ϕ with solvability of
certain finite system of linear inequalities Sϕ, [5, 25].
Before defining the canonical model we need to recall some basic notions. The
(modal or) probability depth of a formula ϕ is the maximum number of nesting prob-
ability operators used in ϕ. More formally,
Definition 2.8. • δ(p) = 0, for each atomic formula p.
• δ(¬ϕ) = δ(ϕ).
• δ(ϕ ∧ ψ) = δ(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max(δ(ϕ), δ(ψ)).
• δ(Lrϕ) = δ(Msϕ) = δ(ϕ) + 1.
For a formula ϕ , let local language Lϕ be the largest set of formulas satisfying the
following conditions:
• The propositional variables are those occur in ϕ.
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• Each r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1] appears in a probability operators of a formula in Lϕ is a
multiple of 1
qϕ
where qϕ is the least common multiple of all denominators of the
rational numbers appearing in probability operators in ϕ.
• The depth of formulas in Lϕ is at most δ(ϕ).
It is clear that up to logical equivalence the local language Lϕ consists of only finitely
many formulas.
Now we state the following fact. We refer the reader to [25], Theorem 3, for the
construction of Sϕ as well as its complete proof. We should only point out whenever
ϕ is a positive probability formula, the set Sϕ consists of only closed inequalities, i.e.
linear inequalities of form x1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + xn ≥ r or x1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + xn ≤ s.
Fact 2.9. For any probability formula ϕ there is a system of linear inequalities Sϕ such
that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if Sϕ is solvable.
The following crucial lemma follows from Fact 2.9 and is needed for characterizing
the satisfaction relation of the canonical model.
Lemma 2.10. Let Γ be a finite set of positive formulas. If Γ∪{Lrϕ} is not satisfiable,
then there is a rational number r′ with 0 < r′ < r such that Γ∪{Lr′ϕ} is not satisfiable.
Similarly, if Γ∪{Msϕ} is not satisfiable, then there is a rational number s′ with s < s′ < 1
such that Γ ∪ {Ms′ϕ} is not satisfiable.
Proof. First of all, without loss of generality we may assume that Γ is satisfiable. Put
ψ = ⋀Γ ∧ ϕ. Let {H1, . . . ,Hn} be the set of all maximally satisfiable sets of formulas
over Lψ. Associate to each Hi a variable xi. Note that each formula in Lψ is logically
equivalent to a disjunction of (conjunction of) Hi’s. So, for every formula θ in this
fragment let Iθ ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, such that θ ≡ ⋁i∈Iθ ⋀Hi.
Since Γ is a finite set of positive formulas, γ = ⋀Γ is also a positive formula. On
the other hand, the positive formula γ is equivalent to a disjunction of (satisfiable)
formulas of the form
γi =⋀
j
pij ∧⋀
j′
¬pij′ ∧⋀
l
Lrilϕil ∧⋀
l′
Msil′ϕil′ .
Γ∪{Lrϕ} is not satisfiable, it follows that for each i, {γi}∪{Lrϕ} is not satisfiable. So
without loss of generality we may assume that γ is of the form
γ =⋀
j
pj ∧⋀
j′
¬pj′ ∧⋀
l
Lrlϕl ∧⋀
l′
Msl′ϕl′.
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Associate to Lrlϕl a linear inequality of the form ∑i∈Iϕl xi ≥ rl. Likewise, for a
formula Mrl′ϕl′ , consider the linear inequality of the form ∑i∈Iϕl′ xi ≤ sl′ .
Let SΓ be the set of all above inequalities together with
xi ≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ n
xi ≤ 1 1 ≤ i ≤ n
x1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + xn ≥ 1
x1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + xn ≤ 1.
By Fact 2.9 SΓ is solvable, since Γ is satisfiable. Now consider the following opti-
mization problem:
Maximize ∑
i∈Iϕ
xi
Subject to SΓ.
Since SΓ is solvable, it defines a non-empty closed and bounded set of Rn. Hence by
the Fundamental theorem of linear programming (see Theorem 3.4 in [21]) the above
problem has a solution. Let M be the maximum value of ∑i∈Iϕ xi. Since Γ ∪ {Lrϕ} is
not satisfiable, SΓ ∪ {∑i∈Iϕ xi ≥ r} is not solvable. Hence it follows that M < r. So for
every rational number r′ with M < r′ < r, one can see that Γ∪{Lr′ϕ} is not satisfiable.
The other assertion can be shown similarly.
Proposition 2.11. Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable positive theory. Then Γ can be ex-
tended to a maximally finitely satisfiable positive theory. Furhermore, if Γ is maximally
finitely satisfiable then for each PPL-formula ϕ and r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1], Γ contains at least
one of the formulas Lrϕ and Mrϕ.
Proof. Suppose that ψ1, ψ2, . . . is an enumeration of positive formulas. Put Σ0 = Γ.
For each n ∈ N define
Σn+1 =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Σn ∪ {ψn+1} if it is finitely satisfiable,
Σn otherwise.
Let Σ = ⋃Σn. Then it is easy to see that Σ is maximally finitely satisfiable positive
theory. Now suppose that Γ is maximally finitely satisfiable and Lrϕ /∈ Γ. So there
is a finite subset Σ′ ⊆ Γ such that Σ′ ∪ {Lrϕ} is not satisfiable. But this implies that
Σ′ ⊧Mrϕ and then each finite subset Σ′′ of Γ including Σ′ has a model satisfying Mrϕ.
Therefore Γ ∪ {Mrϕ} is finitely satisfiable and as Γ is maximally finitely satisfiable, it
follows that Mrϕ ∈ Γ.
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Next proposition introduces examples of maximally finitely satisfiable PPL-theories
and is needed for Theorem 2.13.
Proposition 2.12. Let (M,w) be a finitely additive probability model. Then the posi-
tive theory of (M,w), i.e. Th+(M,w) = {ϕ ∈ PPL ∣ M,w ⊧ ϕ}, is a maximally finitely
satisfiable PPL-theory.
Proof. Suppose that Σ is a finitely satisfiable PPL-theory containing Th+(M,w). By
induction on the complexity of formulas we can show that if φ ∈ Σ then φ ∈ Th+(M,w),
for each PPL-formula φ.
Theorem 2.13 (PPL-Compactness). Let Γ be a finitely satisfiable positive theory.
Then Γ has a finitely additive probability model.
Proof. In the following we define the model (M,w0) in a way that M,w0 ⊧ Σ.
Let ΩC be the set of all maximally finitely satisfiable sets of positive formulas. Put
Θ = {[ϕ] ∣ ϕ is a positive formula}
where [ϕ] = {w ∈ ΩC ∣ ϕ ∈ w}. Note that the set (Θ,∩,∪, [⊥], [⊺]) forms a lattice and
for every ϕ,ψ ∈ PPL, we have the followings
• [ϕ] ∩ [ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ψ].
• [ϕ] ∪ [ψ] = [ϕ ∨ ψ].
Moreover, as PPL is not closed under negation, ΩC is not an algebra. Now we
define the function T ′ ∶ ΩC ×Θ→ [0,1] as follows:
T ′(w)([ϕ]) = sup{r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1] ∣ Lrϕ ∈ w}.
Claim. For each w ∈ ΩC the function T ′(w) is a valuation on the lattice Θ.
Proof of Claim. Let w ∈ ΩC .
• T ′(w)(∅) = 0, since Lr ⊥ is not satisfiable for any r > 0.
• Suppose that [ϕ] ⊆ [ψ]. Then we have to prove that T ′(w)([ϕ]) ≤ T ′(w)([ψ]).
We show that if [ϕ] ⊆ [ψ], then we have ϕ ⊧ ψ. Otherwise, there exists a
model N, v ⊧ ϕ and N, v ⊭ ψ. So, ϕ ∈ Th+(N, v) and ψ ∉ Th+(N, v), which is a
contradiction by Lemma 2.12.
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• We have to show that for all [ϕ1], [ϕ2] ∈ Θ,
T ′(w)([ϕ1]) + T
′(w)([ϕ2]) = T
′(w)([ϕ1] ∪ [ϕ2]) + T
′(w)([ϕ1] ∩ [ϕ2]).
Suppose that T ′(w)([ϕi]) = αi, for i = 1,2 and T ′(w)([ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]) = α∨ and
T ′(w)([ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]) = α∧.
If α1 + α2 < α∨ + α∧, then find ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ∨, ǫ∧ > 0 such that α′i = (αi + ǫi) ∈ Q for
i ∈ {1,2}, and α′i = (αi − ǫi) ∈ Q, for i ∈ {∧,∨}, and (α
′
1
)+ (α′
2
) < (α′
∨
)+ (α′
∧
). But
in this case {Mα′
1
ϕ1, Mα′
2
ϕ2, Lα′
∨
(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), Lα′
∧
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)} is a finite subset of w
and not satisfiable, a contradiction.
A similar argument shows that the inequality α1 +α2 > α∨ +α∧ leads to a contra-
diction.
Now let B(Θ) be the boolean algebra generated by Θ. By Fact A.3 for every
w ∈ ΩC , one can extend the valuation T ′(w) to a finitely additive measure T ′′(w) on
B(Θ). Subsequently, by Fact A.4 we can extend each T ′′(w) to a finitely additive
measure TC(w) on P(ΩC). Note that the measurability of TC ∶ Ω × P(ΩC) → [0,1]
comes for free. Now to define the valuation function vC , for each proposition p, put
vC(p) = {w ∈ ΩC ∣ p ∈ w}.
Having defined functions TC and vC , we assume the modelMC = (ΩC ,P(ΩC), TC , vC).
The following claim characterizes the satisfaction relation of MC .
Claim. For every positive formula ϕ and w ∈ ΩC ,
MC ,w ⊧ ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ w.
The above claim states that inside MC , for each ϕ we have JϕKMC = [ϕ].
Proof of Claim. The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of positive formu-
las. The induction base for atomic formulas as well as the induction step for boolean
operators ∧,∨ are clear.
Now consider the case where ϕ = Lrψ, knowing that JψKMC = [ψ]. Now suppose
w ∈ [Lrψ]. So, Lrψ ∈ w and TC(w)([ψ]) = sup{α ∣ Lαψ ∈ w} ≥ r. So by induction
hypothesis TC(w)(JψKMC) ≥ r. Conversely, suppose that w ∈ JϕKMC . In this case by
induction hypothesis we have TC(w)([ψ]) ≥ r. Therefore, sup{α ∣ Lαψ ∈ w} ≥ r. Now if
Lrψ /∈ w, then, as w is maximally finitely satisfiable, w∪{Lrψ} is not finitely satisfiable.
So there exists a finite subset w′ of w such that w′ ∪ {Lrϕ} is not satisfiable. Thus,
15
by Lemma 2.10 there exists r′ < r such that w′ ∪ {Lr′ψ} is not finitely satisfiable and
Lr′ψ ∉ w. But this contradicts with sup{α ∣ Lαψ ∈ w} ≥ r. Hence JϕKMC = [ϕ] and the
induction is proved for Lrϕ. Lemma 2.10 can be applied to show that the induction
hypothesis holds for ϕ =Msψ.
Now having proved the claim we can finish the proof by noticing that if Γ is a finitely
satisfiable theory, then by Lemma 2.11 one can find a maximally finitely satisfiable w
which includes Γ. Hence we have that MC,w ⊧ Γ.
3 The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Number of Probability
Logics
In this section we study the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of the class of probability
and finitely additive probability models. The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of a class of
models C of a logic L is the least infinite cardinal κ such that every satisfiable L-theory
has a model of size at most κ. In this section we prove that this number is uncountable
cardinal of at most 2ℵ0 for the class of probability models, while it is ℵ0 for the class
of finitely additive models.
Theorem 3.1. Let λ be the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of probability models with
respect to probability logic. Then ℵ0 < λ ≤ 2ℵ0.
Proof. If theory Σ is satisfiable then it is consistent. Hence by Theorem 3.2.13 of [22]
there is a canonical model which models Σ. But the size of this model is 2ℵ0 . So,
λ ≤ 2ℵ0 . Furthermore, the following example shows that there is a BPL-theory which
does not have a countable model. Hence the proof is complete.
Example 3.2. Let
Γ = {L 1
2
¬(pi ↔ pj) ∣ i < j, i, j ∈ N}.
Γ is satisfiable, specially it has a model of size 2ℵ0 . To see this, define the model N
as follows. Let ΩN = {0,1}N and AN be a product σ-algebra, i.e. a σ-algebra generated
by direct product ∏i∈NAi where except for a finite number of Ais the rest of them are
{0,1}. Suppose µ(0) = µ(1) = 1
2
and T ((0i)i∈N) is a product measure of µ. Moreover,
for each proposition pj put v(pj) = {(wi)i∈N ∣wj = 1}. Therefore,
T ((0i)i∈N)({(wi)i∈N ∣N, (wi)i∈N /⊧ pl ↔ pj}) =
T ((0i)i∈N)(∏
i∈N
Ai) + T ((0i)i∈N)(∏
i∈N
Bi) =
1
22
+
1
22
=
1
2
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where Al = Bj = {1} and Aj = Bl = {0} and Ai = Bi = {0,1} otherwise. So N, (0i)i∈N ⊧ Γ.
Now we show that there is no countable model for Γ. Suppose M,w ⊧ Γ and
ΩM is a countable set. Specially we can assume that AM = P(ΩM). Hence we have
∑∞i=1 T (w)({wi}) = 1. Therefore, there is N ∈ N such that ∑
N
i=1 T (w)({wi}) >
1
2
. On the
other hand for each finite number of worlds, say w1, . . . ,wn, there are i, j ∈ N such that
M,wk ⊧ (pi ↔ pj), for k = 1, . . . , n. Since T (w)({w′ ∣M,w′ ⊭ pi ↔ pj}) ≥ 12 , we should
have T (w)({w1, . . . ,wN}) ≤ T (w)({w′ ∣M,w′ ⊧ pi↔ pj}) ≤ 12 , a contradiction.
Remark 3.3. It is shown, for example in [13] any satisfiable PL-theory has an analytic
probability model. On the other hand, any analytic space is either countable or has size
of continuum. Hence the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of class of analytic probability
models is 2ℵ0.
Now we turn to prove the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of finitely additive models.
Theorem 3.4. The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of the class of finitely additive proba-
bility models with respect to probability logic is ℵ0.
Proof. Let Γ be a satisfiable theory and suppose a finitely additive probability model
M = (M,B, T ∶M×B → [0,1], v) models Γ at a point w0 ∈M . We construct a countable
finitely additive probability model M′ which models Γ. To this end, define a countable
set Ω ⊆M which includes w0 and has the property that for each probability formulas
ϕ, if JϕKM ≠ ∅, then Ω ∩ JϕKM ≠ ∅. For each formula ϕ let JϕKΩ = Ω ∩ JϕKM. Put
BΩ = {JϕKΩ ∣ ϕ ∈ PL}. Note that, BΩ forms an algebra. Furthermore,
Claim: If JϕKΩ = JψKΩ, then JϕKM = JψKM.
Proof of Claim. To see this, we may suppose that both sets JϕKΩ, JψKΩ are nonempty.
Now if JϕKM ≠ JψKM, then either of the sets Jϕ ∧ ¬ψKM and Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKM are nonempty.
Hence we have (Jϕ ∧ ¬ψKΩ) ∪ (Jψ ∧ ¬ϕKΩ) ≠ ∅. But this implies that JϕKΩ ≠ JψKΩ.
Now define the function TΩ ∶ Ω × BΩ → [0,1] as follows:
TΩ(v)(JϕKΩ) = TM(v)(JϕKM).
By the above claim TΩ is a well-defined function. It is not hard to see that for each
w ∈ Ω, TΩ(w,−) defines a finitely additive probability measure. Moreover, for each
formula ϕ and r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1],
{w ∈ Ω ∣ TΩ(w, JϕKΩ) ≥ r} = JLrϕKΩ.
Hence T is a measurable function.
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Finally, for each proposition p, put vΩ(p) = vM(p)∩ΩN and set N = (Ω,BΩ, TΩ, vΩ).
By induction on the complexity of formulas one can prove that JϕKN = JϕKΩ. There-
fore, N,w ⊧ Γ.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated probability logic from model theoretic point of view.
Specifically we study the compactness property and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of
probability logic with respect to both of the class of probability models and finitely
additive models. We showed that, although probability logic does not have the com-
pactness property the basic and positive fragments of that are compact respectively to
the class of probability models and finitely additive probability models. Furthermore,
we proved that the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem number of probability logic is 2ℵ0 while it is ℵ0
when we consider finitely additive models.
One of the other interesting issue in model theory which is worthwhile to study
for probability logic is the Lindsto¨m type theorem. The Lindstro¨m type theorems
characterize logics in terms of model theoretic concepts. In 1969 Lindstro¨m proved
that first-order logic has the maximal expressive power among the abstract logics con-
taining it with the compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem properties. This kind of
characterization is widely studied for other logics specially for modal logics, for exam-
ple [18, 20, 16, 4, 26]. In addition to the compactness, bisimulation invariance property
used to prove a characterization theorem for modal logic. Bisimulation of Markov pro-
cesses is widely studied in many literature and some kind of definitions are given for
them, [2, 3, 1]. In all versions of Lindstro¨m’s style theorems the compactness property
plays an essential rule. Kurz and Venema in [14] asked whether one can give a version
of Lindstro¨m theorem for non-compact logic such as probability logic.
Since studying probability logic from coalgebraic perspective is significant in com-
puter science, investigating the problems of this paper and finding an appropriate
version of Lindstro¨m’s theorem for this logic can be a good guide for giving a general
version of Lindstro¨m’s theorem for non-compact logic.
One of the other valuable issues is to study first-order probability modal logic.
There are a few literature considering some versions of first-order probability logic, see
[9, 19].
Acknowledgments. Part of results of this paper is presented in a short talk given in
Advances in Modal Logic 2018 [17]. The authors would like to thank to anonymous
referees for giving some instructive comments which have been useful in proving our
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A Appendix
In this part some basic notions and results from measure theory, used in this paper,
are reviewed. For further reading on measure theory see [6].
Recall that a family A of subsets of a non-empty set Ω is called a lattice if ∅,Ω ∈ A
and it is closed under finite unions and intersections. If, furthermore, A is closed under
complements then it is a boolean algebra (or simply an algebra). Call an algebra A a
σ-algebra provided that if it is closed under countable unions. For a collection A of
subsets of P(Ω), there exists a σ-algebra σ(A) generated by A which is the intersection
of all σ-algebras containing A. While P(Ω) is an obvious example of a σ-algebra over
set Ω, for a topological space (Ω, τ) the family C of closed subsets of Ω forms a lattice.
Furthermore members of σ(C) are called Borel subsets of Ω.
Moreover, A ⊆ P(Ω) is called a monotone class if it is closed under unions of
countable increasing sequences and also intersections of countable decreasing sequences.
Fact A.1 (Monotone class). (Lemma 2.35 in [6]) The monotone class generated by an
algebra A is equal to σ(A).
A measurable space is a pair (Ω,A) where A is a σ-algebra on the non-empty set Ω.
Each A ∈ A is named a measurable set. For two measurable spaces (X,A) and (Y,B)
the function f ∶X → Y is a measurable function if f−1(B) ∈ A for each B ∈ B.
Let A be a lattice over Ω. Then a non-negative real-valued set function µ ∶ A → R
is a valuation if it satisfies the following conditions:
• (Strictness) µ(∅) = 0,
• (Monotonicity) if A ⊆ B is in A, then µ(A) ≤ µ(B),
• (Modularity) µ(A) + µ(B) = µ(A ∪B) + µ(A ∩B), for all A,B ∈ A.
In case A is an algebra then the function µ ∶ A → R is called a finitely additive
measure. In this situation modularity implies monotonicity. Furthermore, µ is premea-
sure whenever for any {Ai}i∈N of pairwise disjoint members of A if ⋃i∈NAi ∈ A, then
µ(⋃i∈NAi) =∑i∈N µ(Ai).
Finally for a σ-algebra A a premeasure µ ∶ A→ R is called a σ-additive measure.
A finitely or a σ-additive measure µ is a probability measure when µ(Ω) = 1. For
brevity, a σ-additive measure is simply called a measure.
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Fact A.2. Let A be an algebra over Ω. A function µ ∶ A→ R is a premeasure if for each
decreasing sequence A0 ⊇ A1 ⊇ . . . of elements of A, if ⋂iAi = ∅ then limi→∞ µ(Ai) = 0.
A measure space is a triple (X,A, µ) where µ is a measure on the σ-algebra A.
The following standard fact states how to extend a valuation over a lattice L to a
finitely additive measure over algebra B(L) generated by L.
Fact A.3 (Smiley–Horn–Tarski Theorem in [7]). Let µ be a valuation defined on a
lattice L of subsets of X. Then µ can be uniquely extended to a finitely additive measure
µ∗ on the algebra B(L) generated by L.
The following facts can also be shown using Carathe´odory’s extension theorem.
Fact A.4. (Theorem 1.22 in [12]) Let µ be a finitely additive measure on a boolean
algebra A of X. Then µ could be extended to a finitely additive measure on any boolean
algebra A′ containing A.
Fact A.5. (Theorem 1.14 in [6]) Let µ be a finite premeasure on boolean algebra A.
Then µ has a unique extension to µ∗ on σ(A).
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